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ABSTRACT
In the past decade, efforts on climate change mitigation strategies
became not only an issue addressed at the international level, but reached
the local decision-making level. In the U.S., perhaps due to the country's
lack of a more affirmative action in the international negotiation process,
municipalities were encouraged to move forward with progressive
mitigation commitments.
The outcome of the 7 3 rd Annual U.S.
Conference of Mayors in Chicago, 2005, reflected just that: 141 U.S.
Mayors signed the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement. This
agreement established a goal for the participating cities of a seven percent
greenhouse gases reduction target. This quantified commitment in the
Mayor's Agreement reflected that set forth for the U.S. in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol. After the Mayor's Conference, in 2006, Denver's Mayor, John
W. Hickenlooper, introduced Greenprint Denver, constituting a set of
public policies aimed at mitigating Denver's carbon footprint along the
terms of the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement.
Against this background, this article examines Denver's strategies
in light of the risk regulation theory. The ultimate goal is to analyze
efficiency in Greenprint Denver based on an in locus experience provided
by Study Space Denver 2008. Because of the underlying uncertainty on
the causation between the best local climate change mitigation policy and
the real and concrete impact on a global environmental problem, this
article argues that efficiency can only be measured procedurally. In that
sense, considering local policies have the potential to impact people's
lives directly, both positively and negatively, whether they are being
efficient can either justify or fail to justify some of the burdens borne by
groups of local residents. Assuming science is not able to deliver with
certainty the underlying information on the causation between what the
top regulatory burden priorities are and the possible positive mitigation
impacts on a range of global environmental natural disasters, this paper,
through the Denver Case Study, argues that ampler public participation
increases legitimacy, reduces asymmetric information, shares
responsibilities over the final results of any policy, and tends to be more
efficient procedurally from a burden sharing perspective.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, the international community successfully mana ed to
agree upon the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. This
remarkable multilateral agreement represented an expansion of the 1972
Stockholm Declaration on the Environment, where diverse nations with
distinctive economic development priorities formally recognized the need
to address global environmental problems from a common set of guiding
principles. While the Stockholm Declaration focused primarily on local
pollution problems, the Rio Declaration turned to those of transnational
impacts. The downside, though, is that the Rio Declaration itself being
international soft law, it fails to promote action and binding commitments
worldwide. Without a set of worldwide enforceable rules, global
environmental problems become deeply dependent upon collaboration
among and within nations.
Climate change is one such global
environmental problem not bound by political borders and heavily
dependent upon national and local actions.
On the flip side, the potential competitive impacts on national
economies from any ambitious mitigation action, along with the lack of
precise scientific information on the causation between climate change
and natural disasters, are both elements inhibiting stronger societal
involvement. That is because mandatory mitigation actions impose costs
upon different sectors of a country's economy and since precise causation
between increasing global temperatures and the magnitude, frequency, and
impacts of natural disasters cannot be firmly established, consensus upon
stronger action among and within societies differ. Therefore, not only
international commitment, but also domestic and local commitments merit
attention. The U.S., even in spite of its resistance to join in international
environmental commitments, has long been pioneering the enactment and
promotion of environmental laws and policies. More recently, the country
has been actively promoting environmental markets, including emissions
trading schemes, and, in the area of climate change, a climate bill is

1See generally United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment andDevelopment,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12 1992).
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currently before Congress without prejudice to different states'
initiatives.'
With respect to climate change, even in spite of all the opposition
to stronger federal commitments from the Administration of then U.S.
President George W. Bush and the prior U.S. Congress, U.S.
municipalities stepped forward and promoted local actions aimed at
contributing positively to the worldwide climate problem. As a result of
the 73 rd Annual U.S. Conference of Mayors in Chicago, 2005, 141 U.S.
Mayors signed the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement,
committing to adopt the U.S. target set forth in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of
seven percent reduction in greenhouse gases emissions from the 1990
levels by 2012. This landmark agreement fostered a wide range of local
action throughout the country, including Denver, one of the participating
cities in the Climate Protection Agreement.
In 2006, Denver's Mayor, John W. Hickenlooper, introduced
Greenprint Denver, "an action agenda for sustainable development for the
City and County of Denver." During Study Space Denver 2008,4 the
2 See,

e.g., Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, C02 Budget
Trading Program,
Homepage, http://www.rggi.org/home (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) ("[T]he first
mandatory, market-based effort in the United States to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states will cap and then reduce CO 2 emissions from
the power sector 10% by 2018."); California Environmental Protection Agency, Air
Resources Board, Assembly Bill 32 - California Global Warming Solutions Act,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) ("In 2006, the
Legislature passed and Governor Schwarzenegger signed AB 32, the Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, which set the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal into
law. It directed the California Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) to begin developing
discrete early actions to reduce greenhouse gases while also preparing a scoping plan to
identify how best to reach the 2020 limit. The reduction measures to meet the 2020
target are to be adopted by the start of 2011.").
3 John W. Hickenlooper, Mayor of Denver, Letter from the
Mayor (July 12, 2006),
http://www.greenprintdenver.org/about/letter-from-the-mayor/.
4 See Registration form, Study Space III: Evaluations of Human Habitats and Habits in
the 21 " Century, Private and Public Lands in the Post-Colonial North American West
(Nov. 29-Dec. 6, 2008), availableat http://www.law.du.edullatcrit/documents/studyspace-iii.pdf ("Study Space is an intensive series of workshops, held at diverse locations
around the world, the goal of which is to acquire a deeper understanding of the legal,
policy and human challenges posed by the global growth of megacities. The emphasis of
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participants had a unique opportunity to experience in person some of the
topics listed in this important sustainable development plan. Ten items are
highlighted as the goals of Greenprint Denver Action Agenda.5 For the
purpose of this paper, item one of Greenprint Denver Action Agenda, the
item directly relating to climate change mitigation, is the only one
examined. The reason for such exclusionary selection is threefold: (1)
Denver is a signatory of the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement;
(2) climate change mitigation is expressly stated as the first listed goal of
the Greenprint Denver Action Agenda; and (3) as a part of Denver's local
policy, Study Space 2008 provided a useful case study for a more practical
analysis of the deficiencies and merits of a climate change regulatory
policy at the local level under a risk regulation perspective.
Considering that local policies have the potential to directly impact
people's lives, both positively and negatively, this study took a one-week
onsite opportunity to examine the climate change mitigation goal of
Greenprint Denver Action Agenda in light of a risk regulation perspective.
Assuming science cannot demonstrate the causation between what the top
regulatory burden priorities are and the possible positive mitigation
impacts on a range of global environmental natural disasters, the Denver
case study indicates that ampler public participation increases legitimacy,
reduces asymmetric information, and shares responsibilities over the final
results of climate change mitigation policies; therefore, this tends to be
considered more efficient procedurally.
Worth noticing, however, is that economic analysts differentiate
between the notion of risks and uncertainty or ignorance. In that sense,
risky situations are those "where the precise outcome cannot be predicted
but a probability distribution can be specified... .6 Uncertainty situations
occur "where one does not even know the parameters of the outcomes."7

each Study Space week is on applied learning, supplemented by lecture and group
discussion.").
5 See GREENPRINT DENVER, GREENPRINT DENVER PLAN 6 (2006), availableat
www.greenprintdenver.org/docs/greenprint-report.pdf.
6 Aaron Wildavsky, The PoliticalEconomy ofEfficiency: Cost-BenefitAnalysis, Systems
Analysis, and ProgramBudgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292,296 (1966).
7

id.
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This paper works with the notion of uncertainty, because the selection of
the policy that best maximizes public resources fails the causation test
when the addressed problem is natural disasters due to global warming.
In addition, establishing probabilities in the causation between real and
concrete impacts of a local policy to a worldwide environmental problem
like climate change is quite an impossible exercise. 9 Therefore, this study
focuses on the uncertainty aspect of risk regulation in which cost-benefit
analysis encounters severe obstacles to serve as the fundamental
maximization tool available to local regulators.
To verify whether Denver's climate change policy is effective
procedurally under a risk regulation perspective, section II describes the
climate change risk and demonstrates the difficulties of scientific
knowledge at providing the best information to create a set of local
policies that are better suited to address the problems of climate change
globally. Subsequently, the analysis turns in section III to an overview of
undergoing endeavors to regulate the climate change risk at different
levels, from international to local. In the same section, this paper attempts
to illustrate the difficulties in relating problems and causes of climate
change in different levels of risk regulation. Section IV then provides an
overview at Denver's climate change risk regulation strategy, building on
the onsite experience from Study Space Denver 2008. Finally, before a
conclusion can be stated, section V attempts to formulate some policy
recommendations from a risk regulation perspective relating specific
examples from the Denver experience.

8 See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 5 (Univ. of Chi., Olin

Law & Econ. Program, Working Paper No. 227, 2004), availableat
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/227-crs-environment.pdf (building on the work
of Richard A. Posner in the terms of decision theory based on which "Posner contends
that global warming presents a situation of uncertainty, where probabilities cannot be
assigned to outcomes, rather than risk, where such probabilities can be assigned").
9
See Aaron Wildavsky, The PoliticalEconomy ofEfficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis,
Systems Analysis, and ProgramBudgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 292, 296 (1966),
availableat http://www.jstor.org/stable/973301 ("The cost-benefit analyst must learn to
live with uncertainty, for he can never know whether all relevant objectives have been
included and what changes may occur in policy and in technology.").
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II. ACKNOWLEDGING CLIMATE CHANGE RISK

Although the increase in the Earth's temperature is a natural
occurring phenomenon, anthropogenic interference has being speeding up
this process at an alarming rate. Eleven out of the twelve years from
1995-2006 are among the twelve warmest years in record.' 0 Increases in
sea level, decreases in snow and ice, alteration in rainfall patterns, and
changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events are some
observed causes linked to global warming."
The causation between
human activities and global warming is established by the increase in
greenhouse gas emissions coming from the growing energy demand,
transport, industry, deforestation, and agriculture sectors.1 2 Greenhouse
gases are so called because while the gases allow sunlight to come through
the atmosphere, the gases also trap the heat produced thereof impeding it
from being released back out of the Earth.' 3
In comparison with pre-industrial levels, concentration of carbon
dioxide (hereinafter "C0 2 ") in the atmosphere increased from 280 parts
per million (hereinafter "ppm") to 379 ppm in 2005. 14 CO 2 is the main
10

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
SYNTHEsIS REPORT 30 (2007) [hereinafter IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT], availableat

http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
" Id.
12 See id. at 37 ("Global atmospheric concentrations of C0 2, CH 4 and N 0 have increased
2
markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial
values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. The atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 and CH 4 in 2005 exceed by far the natural range over the last
650,000 years. Global increases in CO 2 concentrations are due primarily to fossil fuel
use, with land-use change providing another significant but smaller contribution. It is
very likely that the observed increase in CH 4 concentration is predominantly due to
agriculture and fossil fuel use. The increase in N 20 concentration is primarily due to
agriculture.").
13See id. ("Changes in the atmospheric concentrations of GHGs and aerosols, land cover
and solar radiation alter the energy balance of the climate system and are drivers of
climate change. They affect the absorption, scattering and emission of radiation within
the atmosphere and at the Earth's surface. The resulting positive or negative changes in
energy balance due to these factors are expressed as radiative forcing, which is used to
compare warming or cooling influences on global climate.").
14 id
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anthropogenic greenhouse gas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (hereinafter "IPCC") is composed of scientists from around the
world who are responsible for compiling the best scientific information
available to develop and issue periodical reports on climate change.'s As
such,
[t]he IPCC does not conduct any research nor does it
monitor climate related data or parameters. Its role is to
assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent
basis the latest scientific, technical and socio-economic
literature produced worldwide relevant to the understanding
of the risk of human-induced climate change, its observed
and projected impacts and options for adaptation and
mitigation. 16
In its latest report, in 2007, the IPCC has noted that higher
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have risen to a point
which leads to the conclusion that global warming is "very likely"
attributed to anthropogenic activities.' 7
To be sure, there are conflicting scientific studies challenging the
causation between human activities and natural disasters attributed to
global warming. Even when causation is not disputed, some maintain that
increasing global temperatures are either not as harmful as the IPCC
argues or that climate change is a natural phenomenon that would occur
regardless of any anthropogenic interference.' 8 The Associated Press, for
instance, prepared a compilation of climate change misconceptions.
According to this summary, conflicting information over the science
underlying climate change includes: "satellites shows global cooling, not
is See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
About IPCC,

http://wwwl.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm (last visited April 2, 2010) (containing information
about the IPCC's roles and responsibilities).
1 id.
17 IPCC SYNTHESIS REPORT, supranote 10, at 39.
18 See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 37 ("Unlike Posner, I suspect that the likelihood of real

catastrophe from global warming is low, and hence that he is wrong to say that no
probability can be assigned to it.").
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warming," "a planet warmer by 2 degrees Fahrenheit doesn't sound bad,"
"the sun's variability is the biggest cause of climate change," "recent
warming is a natural rebound from the European 'little ice age,'"
"warming is good because it will save us from a new ice age[,]" and "a
melting arctic ice cap won't raise seas; ice melting in a glass doesn't raise
the water level."' 9 In spite of the controversy of whether climate change
is happening or if it can be attributed to anthropogenic interference, that is
not the underlying point of this paper's argument. Rather, this controversy
is to illustrate that conflicting scientific information over a global
environmental problem, like climate change, is not able to calculate with
certainty what exactly the positive impact a local climate change
mitigation policy has on the global problem in the future. That does not
mean, and this is not what this paper is proposing, that no mitigation
action should be pursued at the local level. Instead, that procedurally,
under a risk regulation perspective, a more efficient approach to regulating
the climate change risk should be thought-out and carefully designed.
In sum, the above-described conflicting scientific information is
the background presented to lawmakers and policymakers at all levels,
from global to local. Therefore, understanding the role of the law and
regulations before scientific uncertainty and/or ignorance is the first step
towards more stable and balanced legal outcomes. But reaching efficient
legal and regulatory results is also the challenge typical of the risk society
we currently live in.20 Nicklas Luhmann described such a situation as
when

19 Misconceptions about Climate Change, MSNBC, Feb. 18, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6994470/ns/usnews-environment/#storyContinued.
20
See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 28-29 (Mark Ritter
trans., Sage Publ'ns 1992) (1986) ("Risk determinations are an unrecognized, still
undeveloped symbiosis of the natural and the human sciences, of everyday and expert
rationality, of interest and fact. They are simultaneously neither simply the one nor only
the other. They can no longer be isolated from one another through specialization, and
developed and set down according to their own standards of rationality. They require a
cooperation across the trenches of disciplines, citizens' groups, factories, administration
and politics, or which is more likely - they disintegrate between these into antagonistic
definitions and definitionalstruggles.").
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we look not at individual projects but at larger research
contexts, we realize that science cannot very well live by
self-criticism or falsification alone, for this would rapidly
exhaust all suitable stores of knowledge. In the long run,
sustainable truths must continuously be generated, and the
risk run by certain research complexes or entire disciplines
lies in not being able to do just that.2'
Therefore, the decision over regulating climate change, just like any other
area of environmental law, begins with reducing asymmetric information22
as an attempt to mitigate the impacts of the social and economical
burdens 23 born by society in general.224 That is because, in part, "[t]here is
no expert on risk." 25 The less asymmetric information there is, the lower
the degree of uncertainty there is and, consequently, the more likely the
regulating decision will be a better one. 2 6 Better, because more legitimate,
21NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

204 (Rhodes Barret trans., Aldine

Transaction 2005).
22 See generally WALTER NICHOLSON & CHRISTOPHER SNYDER, MICROECONOMIC
THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 221-22 (Thomson Sw. 10th ed. 2008)

(describing the economics, properties and value of information).
23 See James E. Krier, Risk andDesign, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781, 787 (1990)
("While I can
suppose that everybody is interested in minimizing the total costs of error (so long as
doing so is not itself too costly in other, say ideological, terms), I can hardly suppose that
everybody agrees about what kinds of errors cost how much. To the contrary, debates
about risk regulation in particular typically arise because there is so much controversy
about precisely those questions.").
24 See BECK, supra note 20, at 41 ("There is a systematic 'attraction' between extreme
overty and extreme risk.").
See id at 29.
26
See Gene Rowe & Lynn J. Frewer, EvaluatingPublic-ParticipationExercises:A
Research Agenda, 29 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES 512,520 (2004), availableat
http://wwwjstor.org/stable/1557965 (providing different definitions of efficiency in
public participation processes and attempting to demonstrate under one concept of
effectiveness in public participation mechanisms that, "if the exercise process is good (it
is conducted well according to one's definition) then it would seem more likely that the
outcomes will be good than they would be if the process is bad (and if attained, then
arguably due to other factors). For example, it would seem more likely that decision
makers will ignore the recommendation of an exercise (a 'bad' outcome) if they perceive
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but also because, in the context of regulating risks, more efficient
procedurally. 27 The relationship between legitimacy and efficiency in the
decision-making procedure is examined in deeper details in subsequent
sections.
III. REGULATING CLIMATE CHANGE RISK FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL
With regards to climate change, reducing asymmetric information
is being pursued at the global level, but also being underestimated in many
cases at the national and in most cases at the local level.2 8 Even
internationally, considering the difficulties science faces in establishing
causation between the best and more efficient climate mitigation policies
and the real and concrete positive impacts on the problem, regulating
human activities worldwide to address the threat of global climate change
constitutes the major challenge before the climate change legal regime
launched by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (hereinafter "UNFCCC") in 1992. 29 Public participation is key in
reducing asymmetric information regardless of the level of the proposed
policy: international, national or local. But the more local the policy is,
the more difficult it is for science to establish the necessary causation in
light of the global nature of the climate change problem. In other words,
when taking place at the international level, proposed global actions can
it to have been poorly run (e.g., with unrepresentative participants), than if they perceive
it to have been well run (e.g., with representative participants).").
27 See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT, INCENTIVES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 8 (2000)
("From
the work of Vickrey (1945) and Mirrlees (1971) we know that incomplete information is
the explanation of the costly information rents acquired by agents and therefore the
fundamental source of these deadweight losses. So, a major inefficiency of political
conflicts follows from the inefficiency of redistributive instruments due to asymmetric
information.").
28
See Colin Crawford, Our Bandit Future? Cities, Shantytowns, and Climate Change
Governance, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 221-22 (2009) (noting the lack of local voices
in the national and international climate change debates and advocating that "good public
policy and effective legislation for climate change - or any issue of import - must take
into account the views of those it seeks to help and whose behavior it will regulate.").
29
See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
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be better measured than at the local level, considering climate change is an
environmental harm that is not bound by political borders.
International climate change mitigation strategies have been the
object of constant deliberation. Because over half of the anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions come from the energy, industrial, and
transportation sectors, 30 the burden of international policy efforts has been
concentrated in industrialized countries. 3 ' That has triggered conflicts of
interest over distributional impacts of international policy between
developed and developing countries, and particularly fast growing
economies with large greenhouse gas emissions rates, such as China and

India.3 2
In regulating the climate change risk, the international community
mixed a command-and-control type of system by imposing quantified
emission reduction targets upon developed countries with flexible marketbased mechanisms. 33
That was partially accomplished with the
international community agreeing upon the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC in 1997 which enters into force in 2005. More importantly, the
Kyoto Protocol imposed upon the parties the need to orient their actions to

See generally United Nations Convention on Climate Change official website,
Greenhouse Gases Data, http://unfccc.int/ghg data/items/4133.php (last visited Mar. 29,
2010).
31 Binding greenhouse gases reduction commitments have been imposed
upon developed
countries only according to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3, Dec. 11 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S.
148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
32
See JOHN R. JusTUS & SUSAN R. FLETCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS ISSUE BRIEF
FOR CONGRESS: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2006) (noting that in 1998, the U.S.
Senate passed Senate Resolution 98, which "urged the President not to agree to a treaty
that did not include binding commitments for developing countries, or that cause harm to
the U.S. economy").
3 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 31, arts. 3, 6, 12.
30
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the precautionary approach,3 4 a paramount principle of the risk regulation
field.
At the national level, a great deal of action has taken place.
Studying the U.S., for example, a proposed bill to address the threats of
climate change is currently before Congress.36 This landmark bill, if
successful, "would impose limits for the first time on carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas pollution from power plants, factories, and
refineries. It also would force a shift from coal and other fossil fuels to
renewable and more efficient forms of energy." 37 Concomitantly to the
Federal initiative, regional and even state actions along with a promising
and evolving voluntary carbon market have already revealed some degree
of preoccupation with the uncertainty regarding climate change in the
U.S. 38 These different initiatives are evidence of growing domestic action
in the U.S, even in spite of the U.S. Congressional refusal to ratify the
Kyoto Protocol.

34 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

266-78 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) (1995) (describing the precautionary principle in
international environmental law).
3 See generally Sunstein, supra note 8, at 33-37 (providing a review of the relationship
between the precautionary principle and cost benefit analyses in the context of risk
regulation and uncertainty).
36 See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009),
availableat http://www.rules.house.gov/111/LegText/l 11_hr2454 sub.pdf.
37
House Passes Global Warming Bill, CBS NEWS, June 26, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/06/26/politics/main5117623.shtml.
38
See U.S. Department of Energy, Climate Change,
http://www.energy.gov/environment/climatechange.htm (last visited April 2, 2010)
(providing information on different U.S. initiatives to curb greenhouse gas emissions);
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about ("[A]
cooperative effort by ten Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to limit greenhouse gas
emissions."); California Environmental Protection Agency, Air Resources Board,
Assembly Bill 32 - Global Warming Solutions Act, supra note 2 ("In 2006, the
Legislature passed and Governor Schwarzenegger signed AB 32, the Global Warming
Solutions Act of 2006, which set the 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction goal into
law. It directed the California Air Resources Board (ARB or Board) to begin developing
discrete early actions to reduce greenhouse gases while also preparing a scoping plan to
identify how best to reach the 2020 limit. The reduction measures to meet the 2020
target are to be adopted by the start of 201 1.").
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More importantly for purposes of this section, local stakeholders in
the U.S. are mobilizing themselves through their municipal governments
and articulating a climate change mitigation strategy.3 9 At the 7 3rd Annual
U.S. Conference of Mayors, in Chicago, 2005, the participating Mayors,
including the Mayor of Denver, endorsed the U.S. Mayors Climate
40
In its opening statement, this agreement called
Protection Agreement.
state
governments to enact policies and programs
the
national
and
upon
aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions by seven percent below the
1990 level by 2012.41 Comparing that with the proposed American Clean
Energy and Security Act currently before Congress, the overall goal is
similar with different timetables.4 2 The proposed federal bill envisions a
twenty percent reduction below the 2005 level by 2020.43 But, the
problem in the Mayor's Climate Protection Agreement is that when listing
those actions, twelve in total, to take place locally, there is no reference
whatsoever to any kind of public participation." Aside from a provision
providing for helping with climate change education, no reference is made
to the importance and role of an ample public consultation process. 45
Because regulating the climate change risk is a decision taken
under the assumption that causation on what would be the best global
warming mitigation result cannot be established with certainty, a climate
change policy that does not facilitate public participation, regardless of its

3 Despite the limited powers municipalities face in the U.S, cities are striving to take
action on climate change mitigation strategies. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal
Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1980) (demonstrating municipal autonomy is
limited by state and federal powers).
40 See U.S. Conference of Mayors, The U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement
(2005) [hereinafter Mayors Climate Protection Agreement], available at
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/documents/mcpAgreement.pdf; see also U.S.
Conference of Mayors, List of Participating Mayors,
http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/list.asp (last visited April 2, 2010).
41 Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 40.
42 Compare id., with American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009), availableat http://www.rules.house.gov/111/LegText/111_hr2454_sub.pdf.
43 See H.R. 2454, at 525.
4 See Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 40.
45 See id.
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final content, is neither legitimate nor efficient. 46 Because policymakers
cannot be certain of what the best climate change mitigating result will
turn out to be, regardless of their investment choice (i.e. transportation,
energy efficiency, land-use restrictions, tree planting, etc.), opening up the
policymaking process to public consultation discussing where resources
should better be used, increases the legitimacy of the regulating process
and shares responsibilities over the final outcomes. 4 7
In addition, considering the impossibility of answering whether
one or another policy choice is qualitatively better, in light of the scientific
uncertainty on the causation between a specific global warming mitigation
strategy and any natural disaster attributed to climate change, the result
will be more efficient procedurally if the involved interests are not
disproportionally affected, both positively and negatively. And that is
because, "[w]ithout some sense of both costs and benefits - both
nonmonized and monetized - regulators will be making a stab in the
dark." 48 Any environmental-oriented policy choice has an interesting
feature of disproportionally affecting those who bear the regulatory cost
and those who enjoy most, if not all, the benefits thereof.49 In that sense,
if a proposed regulatory action is taken despite scientific uncertainty of

46

See MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 112

(1987) (arguing that "from time to time there can be a high correlation between two sorts
of phenomena without any causal relation between them").
47 See id. at 113 ("In making decisions we select acts in virtue of their power to produce
the outcomes we desire (and hence the states that foster those outcomes). In view of this,
it would be wrong for us to endow our decision theoretic framework with indicators of
the efficacy of our acts that we know to be misleading.").
48 Sunstein, supra note 8, at 5.
49 See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing andForm ofFederalRegulation: The Case
of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1539 (2007), which identifies
distinguishable interest group preferences in environmental regulation (On the one side,
"[e]nvironmentalists (i.e., pro-regulation forces, treated collectively) can be expected to
support forms of regulation that will be effective in achieving the chosen regulatory
standard (which they prefer to be stringent), and reasonably easy to monitor and
enforce." On the other side, "regulated industry (i.e., those who bear the burden, treated
collectively) will generally prefer policy instruments that give the maximum flexibility
and reduce their aggregate costs of complying with the chosen regulatory standard (which
they prefer to be weak).").
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whether it will be the best policy in light of any probable global
contribution to the climate change problem, the more equitable the policy
burden is distributed upon the affected interests, the more this proposed
regulation will be more efficient procedurally. 5 0
Therefore, for the purpose of risk regulation, efficiency in the
decision-making process would be pursued by balancing the burden upon
conflicting impacted interests with the result of the regulatory policy
initiative. 1 The underlying rationale is that since policymakers do not
have the information stating which policy will produce the best result due
to scientific uncertainty with regards to causation, efficiency cannot be
measured taking into account the quality of the final regulatory result. 52
Considering the difficulties of establishing causation between a local
policy and a potential adverse impact on the Earth's climate, in both
temporal and spatial scales, as long as the impacted stakeholders' interests
are balanced, the policy choice is efficient procedurally. Therefore, under
hard uncertainty or ignorance, the rationale can be sought at the regulatory
procedure by institutionalizing and qualifying public consultation
mechanisms as instruments to reduce asymmetric information and to
balance the final results with respect to affected stakeholders.
A. Problems and Causes of Climate Change Risk Regulation and the
Importance ofPublic ParticipationMechanisms
The problems and causes of climate change risk regulation are
manifold. For the purpose of this study, this section examines those

so See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 495, 497

(1986) ("Unless one is willing to concede that regulation is based exclusively on
physical, monetary, or electoral muscle, some explanation of the bases for public
coercion in mediating risk disputes between individuals and groups is necessary.").
51 See Wildavsky, supra note 6, at 294, which notes that "[t]he economic model on which
cost-benefit analysis depends for its validity is based on a political theory. The idea is
that in a free society the economy is to serve the individual's consistent preferences
revealed and rationally pursued in the market place. Governments are not supposed to
dictate preferences nor make decisions."
52 See id. ("While economists might estimate the redistributive consequences of various
projects, they cannot, on efficiency grounds, specify one or another as preferable.").
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identified by the summary of Stephen Breyer's book, Breaking the Vicious
Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation, by Robert A. Pollak,53 as the
problems and causes that relate to the climate change policies. According
to Pollak's overview, three major problems are identified in risk regulation
in general: (1) tunnel vision; (2) random agenda selection; and (3)
inconsistency.54 The underlying causes on these matters are public
perceptions, congressional politics, and uncertainties in the technical
regulatory process.5 5 Problems and causes of risk regulation would
constitute what Breyer's work refers to as the vicious circle.56
Interestingly, definitions provided for each of the identified causes
of the problems of risk regulation are somehow directly or indirectly
associated with the lack of institutionalized and qualified public
consultation mechanisms. Considering public perceptions "are misleading
in situations involving low probability events," and that the public
"distrust experts" and "are exposed to sensational stories in the media,"
those are all results of typical disqualified public consultation
mechanisms. Well and better informed citizens tend to participate more
qualitatively in the decision-making process and are less susceptible to
external and misleading influences.
If Congress is not suited to deal with the detailed regulatory work,
it can lead to inefficient risk regulation because of the likelihood of an
unbalanced result due to the political preferences inherit to the
congressional lawmaking process. 58 Assuming Congressional interference
is inevitable in areas where uncertainty is the main feature, then
institutionalizing a qualified public consultation process is likely to result
s3 See Robert A. Pollak, Regulating Risks, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 179 (1995), available
at http://academico.direito-rio.fgv.br/ccmw/images/4/4c/Regulatingriskpollak.pdf
54

Id. at 180.

" Id. at 181.
56
Id. ("[P]ublic perceptions, congressional politics, and the technical uncertainties of risk
regulation define the 'vicious circle' of Breyer's title - a situation of 'regulatory gridlock'
(p. 51) in which the interaction of public (mis)perception, congressional (re)actions, and
the uncertainties of risk regulation produce tunnel vision, random agenda selection, and
inconsistency.").
55 Id.
8

id.
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in more equitable positive and negative im acts and, thus, increase
efficiency in the decision-making process.
Finally, if technical
uncertainties are inevitable in risk regulation, it is fair to assume a welloriented public consultation process has, at least in principle, the potential
to produce a more equitable result in light of the diversity of interests
among different groups lobbying during the regulatory process.so
Because climate change regulation at the local level fits the risk
regulation area of study, considering the underlying scientific uncertainty
on the causation element, introducing and qualifying public consultation
mechanisms can address most of the causes and problems leading to the
above described vicious circle. Examining some of Denver's initiatives
may indicate whether public consultation and qualification mechanisms
are being pursued and, if not, how that is producing misleading public
policies. But, on the flip side, before analyzing some of the specific
examples provided by the Study Space experience, the next section
addresses some of the benefits of shifting climate change endeavors to the
local level.
B. The Benefits ofShifting Climate Change Risk Regulation Endeavors to
the Local Level
The broader and more qualified the public consultation process is,
the more efficient is the regulatory process over climate change. When
public consultation mechanisms reach out to a large number of citizens
with diverse interests and prepares them to participate qualitatively, the
chances that the regulatory outcome is going to be a more balanced one is

5 See Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Giving Nature ConstitutionalProtection:A Less
Anthropocentric InterpretationofEnvironmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REv. 615, 623 (2008)
("Public Participation is especially valuable in environmental law because environmental
quality--from the negative impacts of pollution to the positive benefits of biodiversity-affects all citizens.").
6 See LAFFONT, supra note 27, at 10 (noting that "[i]n a world of asymmetric
information, any public project creates information rents which cannot be eliminated (or
only at extremely high efficiency costs)").

374

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 17, No. 2
greater.6 ' Professor Colin Crawford stressed that "[i]ncorporating . . .
urban voices in climate change governance can lead to more efficient
solutions." 62 While I agree with Professor Crawford's statement, the
focus of this article is slightly different. Ampler participation is more
efficient in the context of risk regulation not because of its content,
considering the scientific uncertainty with respect to establishing causation
between the best policy and its real and concrete climate change
mitigation impact, but because of the likelihood of more equitable burden
63
sharing among the affected parties.
Climate change is a highly complex issue within environmental
law. It involves a broad range of different areas of scientific knowledge. 64
Along with the difficulties in establishing causation in spatial and
temporal scales between an action or omission and the adverse impacts to
the environment, 65 the decision of over-regulating the climate change risk
has the potential to adversely impact many sectors of the economy.
Inequality between those bearing the regulatory costs and those benefiting
from those policy choices are additional obstacles to regulating the climate

See Ileana M. Porras, The City andInternationalLaw: In Pursuit ofSustainable
Development, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 537, 570-71 (2009) (stressing the importance of
local involvement in the promotion of sustainable development).
62 Crawford, supra note
28, at 225.
63 See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 28 (acknowledging that
"people do not always bear the
full social costs of the regulatory benefits they receive").
64 See Thomas C. Schelling, Some Economics of
Global Warming, 82 AM. ECON. REv. 1
(1992) ("The greenhouse effect itself is simple enough to understand and is not in any
real dispute. What is in dispute is its magnitude over the coming century, its translation
into changes in climates around the globe, and the impacts of those climate changes on
human welfare and the natural environment. These are beyond the professional
understanding of any single person. The sciences involved are too numerous and diverse.
Demography, economics, biology, and the technology sciences are needed to project
emissions; atmospheric chemistry, oceanography, biology, and meteorology are needed
to translate emissions into climates; biology, agronomy, health sciences, economics,
sociology, and glaciology are needed to identify and assess impacts on human societies
and natural ecosystems. And those are not all.").
65 See generally RICHARD LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20 (2004)
(relating uncertainty and environmental injury in the context of spatial and temporal
dimensions).
61
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change risk.66 Therefore, efficiency in light of the underlying scientific
uncertainty may only be measured procedurally.
At the local level, regulating climate change impacts generally on
urban growth, livin and housing choices, transportation, energy, waste,
and water policies.
Changes in current patterns in all of those related
sectors are desirable from a more immediate and safe environmental
perspective, such as cleaner air, water, and soil where causation could be
established more easily than it can in global or transnational
environmental problems. This is the difference referred to in the
introduction section of this work concerning risk and uncertainty or
ignorance. From a climate change perspective, the regulatory burden may
not yet be concretely justifiable. In a macro stage, the work of Eric A.
Posner and Cass R. Sunstein attempts to demonstrate just that. 68
In that sense, amplifying and qualifying public participation at the
local level is necessary as an instrument to balance diverse and conflicting
choices. In other words, regulating climate change risk at the local level is
more efficient procedurally when the burden and benefits over the final
results are more equitably shared. Whether that is attempted and
undergoing in Denver is examined in the following sections.
IV. AN OVERVIEW OF DENVER'S CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REGULATION
STRATEGY

The City of Denver is a signatory of the U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement, a document reflecting the will of 1017 Mayors
See id. at 19 (indicating that a command-and-control system that ignores the
economical implications and scientific uncertainty of environmental matters, tends to be
"unduly burdensome in many significant respects and unduly relaxed in many others,
achieving the worst of both worlds.").
67
See generally REID EWING ET AL., GROWING COOLER: THE EVIDENCE ON URBAN
DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE 17-35 (2008) (highlighting the impacted areas in
urban planning and development in light of climate change).
68 See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565,
1590 (2008) (challenging the efficiency of a regulatory burden over climate change
mitigation strategies instead of a more immediate assistance provided by developed
countries to developing countries).
66
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from the fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
representing over eighty-six million citizens, 69 and would have been the
U.S.' emissions reductions commitments should the country have ratified
the 1997 Kyoto Protocol of seven percent below the 1990 baseline-year by
2012.70 Since then, in 2005, the municipality of Denver launched a
sustainable development plan entitled "Greenprint Denver Initiative"
which was described by Mayor John W. Hickenlooper as "an action
agenda for sustainable development for the City and County of Denver
that demonstrates local government can be an effective force for
innovation and leadership to improve the environment."7 1 In comparison
with the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, Greenprint Denver is
even more ambitious as it envisions a ten percent greenhouse gas
reduction from the 1990 baseline year by 2012.72 As a risk management
policy strategy, Greenprint Denver brings several references to community
involvement, which is something not present in the U.S. Mayors Climate
Protection Agreement.7 3 How public participation is built into Greenprint
Denver and how effectively it is being observed in practice is further
examined in the following subsections.
A. PublicParticipationin the "GreenprintDenver Plan"
Public participation is built into the Greenprint Denver Plan
(hereinafter "GDP"). From Mayor John W. Hickenlooper's opening
statement, to a specific item in the Greenprint Denver Action Agenda
entitled "communications," the plan addresses one important instrumental
component linked to the causes of the problems in regulating risks: public

69 U.S. Conference of Mayors, List of Participating Mayors, supra note 40.
70

See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 31, annex B.

71Hickenlooper, supra note 3.

72 Compare MAYOR'S GREENPRINT DENVER ADVISORY COUNCIL, GREENPRINT DENVER,
CITY OF DENVER CLIMATE ACTION PLAN: FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR

HICKENLOOPER 10 (2007), available at

http://www.greenprintdenver.org/docs/DenverClimateActionPlan.pdf, with Mayors
Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 40.
73
See Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, supra note 40.
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perception.74 How information is conveyed through communication can
impact positively or negatively on public participation mechanisms.
As part of the plan's implementation stage, its executive summary
describes a process that involves community partners. The introduction
refers to the 2004 Denver Listens public feedback sessions, when
"Environmental Responsibility and Environmental Excellence consistently
ranked among the top issues of interest and concern in Denver's
neighborhoods. "75 Among GDP's guiding principles, "[p]artner with
community organizations, cultural institutions and business to achieve
broad impact," stands independently from other, just as important,
principles.76
Finally, one of the agenda's topics is the abovementioned
"Communications," which includes training and capacity-building,
website development, and outreaching and partnering with cultural
Although different from public participation, information
institutions.
and transparency through communication is an essential component of
qualifying and providing the consultation process with the necessary
means to participate in the risk policy design.7 8
However, having a written sustainable plan only guarantees the
institutionalization of the public participation mechanism. It does not
guarantee implementation. As stated above, institutionalizing public
consultation is one piece of the public participation component within the
climate change risk regulation puzzle. Another, just as important, is
qualifying citizens to broaden the scope of interested and potentially

74 See supra Part III.A.

7s See Greenprint Denver, Mission and Guiding Principles,
http://www.greenprintdenver.org/about/mission-and-guiding-principles/ (last visited Mar.
31, 2010).
76 See id.
n GREENPRINT DENVER, supra note 5, at 21.
78 See Rowe & Frewer, supra note 26, at 514, which notes that "some policy formulators
may be more concerned with increasing public confidence in the policy process than truly
seeking the views of the public. Participation conducted for such tokenistic reasons
alone, however, with little intention of acting on the information gathered from the
public, may prove counterproductive should the public appreciate this underlying
rationale and has been much condemned."
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affected groups of people and also to maximize the quality of public
intervention in order to work as an efficient asymmetric information
reduction tool.79 That is something only verifiable in practice, as occurred
during Study Space Denver 2008. Two distinct experiences are further
examined in the following subsections.
B. Lack ofPublic Participationin Practice: "The Five Points
Neighborhood"
When reading about the Five Points neighborhood on Denver's
official website, one might have a different perception than the one
provided by an onsite visit and conversation with local residents.
According to the city's website, Five Points is "[o]ne of Denver's oldest
neighborhoods, with block after block of Victorian homes mixed with
luxury lofts and new housing developments, Five Points is one of the few
predominantly African American-owned commercial strips in the
country."so But what such invitational description does not reveal is that
to support luxury lofts, the land-use policy is leaving out of the
policymaking process those who constitute the majority of the
neighborhood, the African American residents. Along with the city's
natural economic growth process, the downtown area grew in both size
and importance, turning the nearby Five Points neighborhood into an
attractive option for luxury loft developers.
Coincidently, this land-use choice came along with Denver's
version of the New York Broken Windows' policy ' applied

See id. at 515 ("Certainly, the number of [public participation] mechanisms has
multiplied over recent years. What is less certain, however, is their quality and
effectiveness.").
80 City of Denver, Five Points, http://www.denver.org/metro/neighborhoods/five-points
(last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
81 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
From New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 271, 272
(2006), available at http://www.jstor.com.org/stable/4495553 ("In 1982, James Q.
Wilson and George L. Kelling suggested in an influential article in the Atlantic Monthly
that targeting minor disorder - loitering, panhandling, prostitution, graffiti - could help
reduce more serious crime. The 'broken windows' theory produced what many observers
7
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predominantly and almost exclusively to the Five Points' African
American residents.
According to local residents' own testimonies, the
Broken Windows' policy is the means through which the luxury loft
developers and residents are meeting their goals: developing a high value
area close. to the business downtown district, while removing an oldestablished and traditional community that has the potential to lower
property values of those expensive condominiums.
Aside from the many social justice issues involved, the fact is that
onsite interviews demonstrates the lack of knowledge of local residents
and participation in the Greenprint Denver Action Plan for one of the most
traditional neighborhoods in Denver. Neighborhood redevelopment is part
of GDP which, in turn, as abovementioned, has built in it the goal of
climate change mitigation.
Therefore, even if the Five Points
redevelopment was justifiable under a climate change mitigation strategy,
the burden borne by its residents and the lack of forums allowing for their
voices to be heard indicates that, strictly under a climate change risk
regulation procedure, it constitutes an inefficient policy.
If redeveloping neighborhoods is a priority of the City's Office of
Economic Development included in one specific topic of the Greenprint
Denver's Agenda ("Community and Economic Development: Thriving
and Prosperous Urban Environments"), 83 when compared with the Five
have called a revolution in policing and law enforcement. Today, the three most
populous cities in the United States - New York, Chicago, and, most recently, Los
Angeles - have all adopted at least some aspect of Wilson and Kelling's broken windows
theory, primarily through more aggressive enforcement of minor misdemeanor laws, also
known as 'order maintenance' policing." (footnote call numbers omitted) (citing James
Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The PoliceandNeighborhoodSafety,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29, 38 and BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF
ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 46 (2001))).
82
See Gary Stewart, Black Codes and Broken Windows: The Legacy ofRacial Hegemony
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions, 107 YALE L.J. 2249,2257 (1998), availableat
http://www.jstor.com/stable/797421 (arguing that "[t]he history of vagrancy laws reveals
most vividly the dangerous implications for racial minorities and other disadvantaged
communities of broad police discretion in crime prevention").
83 See Greenprint Denver, Community and Economic Development: Thriving and
Prosperous Urban Environments, http://www.greenprintdenver.org/green-buildingindustry/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
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Points case, it indicates that the abovementioned civic engagement
explicitly referred to in the plan is simply rhetorical or, worst, selective in
the sense that it does not include minorities from low income
neighborhoods.
C. PublicParticipationin Practice: "The 2009 Mayor's Climate
ProtectionAward"
The FasTracks plan is described as "a $4.7 billion regional
infrastructure investment, [that] will provide 119 miles of new tracks, 70
new transit stations, 18 miles of bus rapid transit service, 21,000 new
parking spaces at rail and bus stations, and expanded bus service in all
areas.
Such an impressive and ambitious program was only possible
because "[v]oters in eight-county Denver region approved FasTracks in
2004, authorizing a sales tax to help fund the Regional Transportation
District's 12-year expansion plan."8 5 This landmark public consultation
and involvement process was responsible for an authorization of a 0.4%
tax increase which, alone, provided for roughly thirty percent of the
overall project's cost. 86
The public's decision to accept an extra burden of such regulatory
policy, even in light of the uncertainty over the causation between the
quantified and concrete impacts that action will have upon a global
climate change mitigation strategy, is a clear demonstration of how
efficiency is improved procedurally with public participation in the
decision-making processes under a risk regulation perspective. The
decision is also legitimate because those individuals traditionally being
regulated suddenly become regulators. 87 That is well illustrated by this
8

Greenprint Denver, Fastracks,

http://www.greenprintdenver.org/transportation/fastracks/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).

85 U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, MAYORS AND CLIMATE PROTECTION BEST PRACTICES

5 (2009), available at
http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/uploads/ClimateBestPractices061209.pdf.
8
1 d. at 6.
87 See Heather Kilmartin & Evan Mendelson, Transparencyand PublicParticipation
in
the FederalRulemaking Process:Recommendationsfor the New Administration,77 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 924,926 (2009) ("Rulemaking procedures should aim to encourage
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practical example, considering the voter's policy preference represented a
third of the overall project's cost.
V. IMPROVING DENVER'S CLIMATE CHANGE RISK REGULATION POLICY
STRATEGY

All in all, both practical examples examined above provide
important guidance for useful policy recommendations aimed at
improving Denver's climate change risk regulation policy strategy. To
that end, the following subsections are divided into three distinct
categories: (1) public awareness and capacity building; (2) community
involvement and traditional knowledge; and (3) participatory budget. All
the subsections are linked to the overarching premise of ampler public
participation as both a legitimate and efficient strategy in the context of
the process of regulating the climate change risk.
A. PublicAwareness and CapacityBuilding
A crucial part of reducing asymmetric information at the local level with
respect to the risks of global warming and potential mitigation policy
actions is educating city residents on the scientific and technical
information regarding climate change. Just as important at the local
policymaking level is improving awareness over the burdens of any local
policy and the probable, but yet uncertain, causation between the results of

decisions that both are legitimate and achieve the best outcomes for society. The quality
of regulatory outcomes can be assessed against agencies' statutory missions, as well as
more broadly by asking whether specific decisions advance the overall welfare of society.
To ensure legitimacy in the rulemaking process, agency officials should arrive at their
decisions in a fair and transparent manner, specifically by approaching a regulatory
problem with an open mind, taking into account all relevant interests, and arriving at
well-reasoned decisions. In many cases, rulemaking will advantage certain groups and
individuals over others. Still, those who end up "losing" should at least be able to
understand the decisions made by regulators and to feel that their interests were treated
fairly and respectfully." (footnote call number omitted)).
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the regulatory policy and the quantified and overall benefits. 88 Climate
change policies, to be economically viable, might be dependent upon, for
instance, higher transportation or local taxes to attract private investment.
The above-described example of the City of Denver's FasTracks plan
illustrates well that premise. Along with any climate change mitigation
potential, other direct and more concrete benefits such as faster
commuting time, better air quality, and less traffic jams allowed for the
population to accept a 0.4% tax increase after a public consultation
process. 89 Whether that public choice was due to awareness over taking
local action to mitigate global warming, even in spite of all the uncertainty
on temporal and spatial scales, or whether the choice was due to those
more immediate, concrete benefits, such as the abovementioned, is
difficult to measure. 90 But the overarching ideal of making that policy
choice more legitimate and thus more efficient, considering the overall
burden sharing among private investment, local government, and society,
was successfully reached. 9 1
Notwithstanding the foregoing, just conveying the information to
increase public awareness is not sufficient. Public awareness must be

See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 27 (relating people's willingness to pay ("WTP") with
uninformed society: "[i]f people's WTP reflects impulsiveness, recklessness, an absence
of information, or insufficient deliberation, then it is important for other people, in
as elsewhere, to draw their attention to that fact.").
government
89
See U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, supra note 85, at 6.
90 See Rowe & Frewer, supra note 26, at 518 (demonstrating the difficult aspects of
defining effectiveness in the context of public participation exercises in the following
terms: "[a]ssessing the 'quality of ideas' generated might involve value judgments being
applied to those ideas, while focusing on the development of 'group consensus' might,
arguably, detract from the diversity of opinions that may have value in their own right, or
at least should be made public as part of a transparent process").
' The idea of efficiency in public participation processes under uncertainty is the one
focusing on a democratic perspective. In that sense, regardless the quality of the
regulatory outcome under uncertainty as long as public participation allowed for
consensus over the distribution of burdens, the decision is more efficient. Fairness would
be linked to the capacity of public participation mechanisms to reach consensus. See id.
("From a democratic perspective, for example, an effective participation exercise might
be one that is somehow 'fair,' and a number of related criteria might be stipulated.").
88
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accompanied by an effective capacity building strategy. 92 Climate change
involves different expertise from virtually all fields of scientific
knowledge. It is also an area that has the potential to affect various
aspects of someone's life.93 From transportation, housing, and consuming
choices to land-use, fuel switch, energy efficiency, and forestry policies,
the climate change knowledge spans beyond merely expecting the federal
government to take on binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction
commitments. A public campaign aimed at increasing the general public's
knowledge on the impacts local choices might have, not only over the
global climate change problem, but also over the real, immediate and
concrete burdens and benefits of such policies, informing citizens is
crucial to qualifying the public participation process and, consequently,
fulfilling a public policy legitimacy purpose and rising its regulatory
efficiency procedurally. 9
B. Community Involvement and TraditionalKnowledge
Widespread knowledge is an important element of a fertile
environment for ampler community involvement. A fair assumption is
Those are all premises built into the climate change agreement. Article 4.1(i) of the
UNFCCC called all Parties to "[p]romote and cooperate in education, training and public
awareness related to climate change." UNFCCC, supra note 29, art. 4(1)(i); see also id.
art. 6.
93
See PETER NEWMAN & ISABELLA JENNINGS, CITIES AS SUSTAINABLE ECOSYSTEMS:
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 33 (2008) ("Cities face a range of fundamental challenges including climate change, water supply disruptions due to global peaking in production,
regional environmental damage, loss of biodiversity - that require a new kind of clean,
green economy to emerge.").
94 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has already identified the benefits of a
qualified public participation process in the policymaking process at the local level. See
U.S. EPA, Where do we want to be?, http://www.epa.gov/greenkit/intro3.htm (last visited
May 17, 2010) ("Community participation is key. Bringing people together, including
business, industry, and education, along with children, planners, civic leaders,
environmental groups and community associations, allows the vision to capture the
values and interests of a broad constituency. Brainstorming ideas from the entire
community results in a synergistic effect which can bring out a myriad of ideas that
reflects values and interests of the community as a whole.").
92
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that "[w]ere people to understand that decisions were being made that will
affect how they use land and what environmental resources are available
to them, they would likely engage in those decisions and illuminate
Denver's Five Points
justifications for resource distribution." 9 5
neighborhood case, described above, provides useful example of how a
land-use policy ignoring a local community's inputs can be inefficient
even in spite of a greener building strategy behind the will of the local

government. 96
Leaving aside the social justice issue behind the new land-use
development policy for the Five Points neighborhood, without in anyway
undermining this very important aspect of the proposed policy, the burden
imposed upon the neighborhood's residents is disproportional and
illegitimate in light of any possible aim of the proposed policy. Assuming
that new residential developments are more energy efficient than those old
Victorian style houses and, thus, have the potential to mitigate global
climate change, in light of the uncertainty surrounding whether this
specific local regulation is indeed the best climate change mitigation
policy, and considering also the burdens thereof, only community
involvement would be able to legitimize this process.9 7 If some sort of
compensation was presented to local residents in exchange for the
proposed new developments and assuming that was accepted, then the
burden sharing among the affected parties in light of the afore described
uncertaint' would make this regulatory process both legitimate and
efficient.

9

Crawford, supra note 28, at 249.

In construing a visioning process for a long-term vision for sustainable cities, Peter
Newman et al. argues that "[a] vision needs to developed through a community visioning
process - an inclusive and participatory process that brings together people from across
the community and empowers marginalized groups to contribute." NEWMAN &
JENNINGS, supra note 93, at 10.
9 See id. (describing a successful land use planning system developed in Oregon
involving community involvement, informational presentations and public events with
national speakers).
98 See Rowe & Frewer, supra note 26, at 520, which notes that one complex issue of
defining effectiveness in public participation processes "is the fact that there are various
constituencies involved in the process, from the sponsors to the participants and the
9
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I experienced in locus during Study Space Denver 2008 the voices
from different members of traditional communities, mainly indigenous
people and descendants, which left the impression that their concerns and
potential contributions are not being heard at the local policymaking level.
This preliminary impression, of what needs to be an empirical research,
indicates a lack of legitimacy and efficiency in the overall Denver's
Greenprint initiative. 99 While a fair assumption would be that the inputs
of the traditional knowledge historically and abundantly present in
Denverloo could only qualify the final result of any climate change
regulatory action, in light of any such policy's failure to provide scientific
certainty, legitimacy and efficiency are simply verifiable on the regulatory
process. Considering the marginalization process and the land-use
exclusion reported by many traditional communities in locus, Greenprint
Denver as it is applied to the Five Points neighborhood could have a
legitimacy deficit and it is, thus, inefficient procedurally in light of its
failure to balance the interests of affected groups of stakeholders.
In that sense, any attempt of selling scientific certainty on the
overall results of Greenprint Denver could end up implicitly hiding a
discriminatory local policy approach as a global climate change strategy.
A simple solution would be to foster community involvement. Public
awareness and capacity building need to be as inclusive as possible.
Centuries of accumulated traditional knowledge in Denver should be
incorporated into the decision-making process.1ot Assuming there is no
various publics (or stakeholder groups) that they are meant to represent. Hence, what
might appear effective to some might not appear so to others." And that to solve this
problem, an objective perspective is desirable, "in which the contentment or acceptance
of the specific parties involved (who-ever they might be) is an important aspect or
criterion of effectiveness."
" See Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 87, at 927 (arguing that "transparency and
public participation are more usefully seen as tools that can enhance regulators' ability to
achieve society's goal of high-quality and legitimate rules").
100

See generally KATHLEEN A. BROSNAN, UNITING MOUNTAIN & PLAIN: CITIES, LAW
AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ALONG THE FRONT RANGE ch. 2 (2002) (describing the

lack of traditional communities' involvement into Denver's historically urban expansion
rocess).
' See Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 87, at 927 ("Public participation promotes
legitimacy by creating a sense of fairness in rulemaking.").
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other political motivation other than improving local regulatory processes
under uncertainty, an additional contribution of such policy
recommendation also has the potential to share responsibilities over
1 02
undesirable or unpredicted results, for instance.
C. ParticipatoryBudget
Participatory budgeting is another available tool to enhance and
qualify public participation in the policymaking process. At the local
level, the participatory budget allows for citizens to effectively engage in
the decisions of how public resources will be applied. For that, before a
council meeting takes place, where citizens have the opportunity to
express to local officials their choices over how to best invest public
resources, the population engage in preparatory meetings educating
themselves on the pros and cons of any final deliberation that will be
translated into public preferences and ultimately influence the decisionmaking process.10 3 As the number of citizens participating in the
investment and stipends decisions increases, the more legitimate the
process is and, consequently, more efficient procedurally. This is true
especially in light of its potential to balance the final regulatory result
under the assumption that causation between the best local action and its
overall climate change mitigation impact cannot yet be precisely

determined.1 04
See Stepan Wood & Lynn Johannson, Six Principlesfor IntegratingNonGovernmental Standardsinto SmartRegulation, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 345, 360 (2008)
(providing that public participation is essential in smart regulation, considering the state
shares the responsibility of achieving the goals of the regulation with those being
regulated).
103 See generally Crawford,supra note 28, at 244-49 (describing in more details how the
participatory budget works and was first conceived in Brazil).
' See Kilmartin & Mendelson, supra note 87, at 927 ("Not only will transparency and
public participation inevitably help to achieve democratic goals, but they also can help
produce better, more informed policy decisions. Increased participation allows agencies
to obtain information that may help them better understand how current policies could be
improved and also how the public or regulated parties would respond to a change in
policy.").
102
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Considering the climate change topic in Greenprint Denver Action
Agendas05 and its potential to impact every Denvernian's life, should the
city's citizens be able to influence the decision over investment priorities,
the process would be more legitimate and efficient. Furthermore, a
participatory budget type of approach would fit nicely into one of the
Greenprint Denver's guiding principles: "[p]artner with community
organizations, cultural institutions and business to achieve broad
impact."' 06 Some of Denver's initiatives reported in the Greenprint
Denver Plan are suggesting some sort of public involvement in decisions
allowing public expenditure.
One example would be the above cited FasTrack plan, in which
voters accepted a tax increase to help fund a public transportation
project.io7 While the FasTrack example is different in conception from
what an institutionalized participatory budget is, it can serve as a model to
broaden the scope of including and stimulating public participation and
traditional knowledge in the policymaking process. That is an important
premise to pursue in the implementation of the Greenprint Denver Plan in
light of other not as successful experiences in different topics of the city's
sustainable agenda. Under "Community and Economic Development:
Thriving and Prosperous Urban Environments," the implementation of one
of the City's Office of Economic Development priorities, namely
"neighborhood redevelopment and housing options," has indicated a
legitimacy deficit and an inefficiency in the regulatory procedure due to its
failure in balancing the burdens of its final outcome.'os Thus, examples of
the disproportional burden local residents are bearing are the lack of
community involvement, the decision power over public preferences
regarding redevelopment options, and the exclusionary Broken Windows'
policy under the climate change goal in GDP.
Perhaps, an effective public consultation process associated with
the assistance of those holding traditional knowledge, empowered to
influence the definition of priorities through intervention in the city's
105 See GREENPRINT

DENVER, supranote 5.

16

Idat 7.
107 See supra Part IV.C.
1os See supra Part
IV.B.
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budgetary allocation, have the potential to produce more legitimate and
09
efficient local decisions with respect to climate change mitigation.'
While the causation between climate change mitigation strategies and
local actions still lack a definite scientific answer, empowering citizens to
influence a city's budgetary allocation has the potential to share
responsibilities over the final outcome of any regulatory decision taken
under uncertainty. Therefore, institutionalizing the participatory budget
for climate change related decisions turns the policymaking process
inclusive, while sharing the burden over any affected stakeholder.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Climate change is a global and complex environmental problem.
Although scientific knowledge evolved considerably over the past two and
a half decades, the best mitigation actions cannot yet be firmly
determined. Because any mitigation strategy involving regulation has an
impact on every citizen's daily life, and considering the great majority of
people who are currently living in urban areas combined with the
estimates that the numbers of urban dwellers are growing fast,' 1 a balance
between the costs and benefits of local policies must be sought. While
mitigation strategies range from policies in the transportation, land use,
sanitation, forestry, and energy sectors, among others, prioritizing an area
to assist in solving a global environmental problem might not be
justifiable if the costs are too high to bear in light of the scientific
uncertainty behind the causation potentially linking the regulation and the
proposed environmental benefit.
Because causation cannot be firmly determined, the more balanced
the regulatory burden among the affected stakeholders is, the more
efficient is the regulatory process. Efficiency is thus linked to the process
and not to a qualitative analysis of the final regulatory result, considering
0 See Crawford,supra note 28, at 244 ("Participatory budgeting provides an example of
democracy emerging from below and not being imposed from above.").
0
" See NEWMAN & JENNINGS, supra note 93, at 34 ("World urban population has
multiplied twentyfold since 1900 compared to a fourfold increase in total world
population.").
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causation cannot be established on what would be the best policy choice.
When one shifts the focus from a qualitative analysis of the best regulatory
result to the regulatory process, a more balanced outcome is more likely
with an ampler public participation process. Communal involvement
increases legitimacy and, if qualified, reduces asymmetric information,
which, in turn, has the potential to influence positively the final outcome
of such a complex issue like climate change.
I was able to identify some positive initiatives in the Denver
Greenprint Plan along with the in locus experience provided by Study
Space Denver 2008, like the FasTrack. This example counted on some
sort of public participation method that eventually increased the
legitimacy of the proposed policy and was more efficient because it was
able to balance the burden among the different groups of stakeholders
involved. On the other hand, I also identified some bottlenecks
challenging the climate change mitigation goal in the Denver Greenprint
agenda. Some of the challenges included the reported Five Points
neighborhood discriminatory and selective set of policies, and that the
Greenprint Plan explicitly relates community involvement with land-use
redevelopments. Ultimately, the participatory budget as an instrument to
amplify community involvement and empower citizens is an additional
tool for increasing legitimacy and efficiency before a scenario where
causation cannot be precisely determined.
All in all, Denver's Greenprint Plan as a sustainable policy has
merit. However, where it relates specifically to climate change mitigation,
GDP provides positive and negative indications of risk regulation
legitimacy and efficiency. An improvement on public participation
mechanisms through the promotion of public awareness, capacity
building, community involvement, traditional knowledge, and, eventually,
the introduction of a participatory budget type of mechanism, constitutes
real and concrete normative recommendations to strengthen legitimacy
and efficiency in the Greenprint Denver Plan. In the end, those are also
valuable tools to turn regulated citizens into regulators easing some of the
responsibilities falling upon the shoulders of local officials.
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